The battle of Homs... A battle for an Alawite state?

Sixteen months have passed since the Syrian revolution broke out, and Homs is still resistant although many of its residents have fled. What is the reason behind all this cruelty and brutality from the Syrian regime in its war against Homs? Why this city in particular? Is the regime trying to find an alternative to the "security solution" by the foundation of a "sustainable" Alawite state -- considering Homs a  threat to this state? This insistence to take Homs off the map needs to be explained, taking into account that Homs is the third largest city in the country after Damascus and Aleppo, and only 45km away from Hama, the other Sunni city which rose against the Hafez al-Assad regime in 1982. What can be understood after 16 months of popular protests in Syria, is that Homs of 2012 is not similar to Hama of 1982, as the latter witnessed a dreadful massacre which the world knew nothing about until weeks after it was committed. In 2012, Homs has witnessed, and is still witnessing, several massacres in addition to non-stop heavy shelling. The city has turned into an icon for the resistance of the Syrian people, and their insistence to get rid of the ruling regime without accepting any separation or split within their homeland. The question now is not whether Homs will survive or not, but whether the world will let the Syrian regime remove this city from existence, especially as the world is taken now by the Egyptian presidential elections and the chances of economic survival in Greece, while the Syrian regime is very keen on remaining in power even if only in certain parts of Syria instead of the entire country. A sharp observation of the Russian and Iranian stances will show that both countries are probably supporting a separation of the Syrian state, as the ruling regime there has no chance to survive the same way it did since 1970. This can explain the concentration on Homs, the foundation of a new Alawite state in Syria, a state rejected by a large section of the Syrian Alawites themselves. In 1982 both the Arabs and international community remained silent about what Assad the Father committed in Hama, and the destruction of the city was enough to spread fear among the people, so the oppressing regime which took over in 1970 was able to survive for almost 40 more years. That shock succeeded in keeping Syrians silent until 2011 -- not only  Syrians, but the Lebanese too, as he committed crimes in Lebanon's Triboli and Zahleh even before Hama. He burnt a lot of Mulim and Christian cities, villages and neighbourhoods in Lebanon like Sidon, Damour, Ashrafiyeh and the northern Christian villages. Some villages were besieged while others were completely destroyed to spread panic among the Lebanese, as well as to erupt sectarian disputes in the country. After that, he achieved his own "conquest" when his troops entered Beirut in 1990, depending on the cover secured for him by General Michel Aoun (now a Christian MP in Lebanon), who also supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait the same year.  Michel Aoun's genius enabled Assad's troops to enter the presidential palace in Baabda and the Defence Ministry's Headquarters in Yerzi, for the first time since the independence of Lebanon. So Hama of 1982 was a turning point that enabled the Syrian regime to impose full control on both Syria and Lebanon, while Homs of 2012 is expected to be a turning point to the opposite direction, which would see this regime disappears forever. The Syrian regime was expelled from Lebanon in 2005 after the assassination of PM Rafiq al-Hariri, under popular pressure from the Lebanese, especially the Sunni community in the main cities: Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. They retreated to Syria, and their influence in Lebanon remained with the Iran-linked Hezbollah. Instead of trying to find solutions to the sufferings of its own people, the regime thought it could regain its "pride" by repeating the experience of 1982, this time not only in Hama, but in all the Syrian cities, starting with Daraa, the first city to rise up in March 2011. In 1982, the massacre of Hama secured a rebirth for the regime, however, in 2012, the massacres of Homs are likely to write the end of this regime. The massacres of Homs didn't stop the people's uprising -- actually the opposite is true. While the regime's troops were resuming their campaign in Homs, people of other Syrian cities, including Damascus and Aleppo, got more firm in their uprisings. The Syrians are trying to prove in 2012 that history will not be repeated, what began in Hama 30 years ago is ending in Homs, whose people are eager to thwart any plans to split their homeland only for the sake of the survival of the Baath regime. With its racial and sectarian variety, Homs has turned into the heart of the Syrian revolution. The end of this regime could be announced in Homs, after the regime's failure to aknowledge that no tyrant has the ability to abolish his own people forever, regardless of how powerful he is, and regardless of the absolute support from Iran, Russia and China. From Homs, we can see the regime throwing the last card, the card of dividing Syria!    --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.