Rise and fall of the Syrian National Council

A few months ago, it seemed that the Syrian National Council has almost become the only legitimate representative of the Syrian people. It seemed that it considered the rest of the opposition as "objects revolving in its orbit", either to join it or face the risk of obscurity.I saw with my own eyes how senior leaders in the Council (in the executive office) dealt with the rest of the opposition forces with arrogance. What worsens the situation is that the Friends of Syria in Istanbul meeting has recognised the council as a "legitimate" representative of the Syrian people. This recognition has glittering eyes with the seduction of power on the Atlantic's tanks and wings of F-16, yet the recognition of the “Friends” was free of "the only". However, during the Tunisian meeting, the Council got a transition map for Syria, in which the council and the Free Syrian Army play a major role. Today, the shares of the National Council are sharply falling. Washington and many capitals were fed  up with its differences and divisions and after their endeavours to "reunite the opposition"  failed and after developments on the ground have shown the "marginal" role played by the Council. It has also failed to reflect the Syrian political , intellectual and social pluralism. The Council has remained prisoner to the dominant faction: the Muslim Brotherhood and its branches. The Council failed to unite the opposition and did not preserve its internal unity. It failed to reassure the rest of the diverse Syrian people, and indulged itself  in doctrines and sectarian games. It failed to present an image of  Syria tomorrow. Its corruption has expanded and its members vying for a slice of power, prestige, money and media publicity. It has appeared as a "Council of Travel and Tourism Experts" rather than a "Revolution Command Council". Consequently, it deserved today's isolation and erosion in popularity. Add to this, the Council distributed loyalties between Ankara, Riyadh, Washington, Paris and Doha. It was too weak to offer "an alternative to Syria”. The council becomes part of the problem instead of being a key to the solution and turned into a surplus load that is being leisurely gotten rid of, and this is proved by the new trend among decision-making international capitals in search of alternatives among the recent dissidents from the system to directly deal with the armed opposition on the ground (the FSA, Brotherhood and Salafist militias). To the extent that Mrs Clinton did not allocate even half an hour or less on her busy agenda, to make it up with the leaders of the Council resident in Turkey during her recent visit to Ankara. 'Intermediaries" and "messengers " have folded the story of the unity of the Syrian opposition. There are no initiatives at this level (it seems like the dull Palestinian reconciliation). The regional and international decision-making centres have begun to solve on the ground what does not belong to the Syrian National Council, the ground which neither belongs to the control of the regular army nor the FSA. The ground has come under the control of the "military" on both sides of the Syrian conflict. The SNC, of which we hosted a number of its leaders a month after its formation and several times after, was born with imbalances since the beginning. Most of its founding leaders have no experiences in political confrontation and lack combative skills as none of them did go inside Syria although they were talking about the liberation of nearly two-thirds of Syrian territories while praising Syrian  activists, the revolution and its heroes, forgetting that talking about heroism does not make one a hero at all. Then, the Council adopted a "strategy for change in Syria" based on one idea: international military intervention, assuming that the international community will take on the task on its behalf. Most of its leaders were not prepared to discuss any other possibilities and alternative scenarios; they also did not care to exert efforts to unite the opposition as if to say: What is the value of unity if the decisive tool in Syria is not Syria? In order to attract international military intervention (its only strategy), it did use all methods possible; an alliance with capitals that have "strife agendas", defending the "prohibited marriage" between oil and Wahhabism, and playing the game of assurances and guarantees to Israel as well as dabbling in media hype that trades with blood and other tools and methods used which negatively affected its credibility and reliability. They offered their own people three options (literally), and here I am talking as an actual eye-witness (not from neighbouring areas) -- international intervention or civil war and the division of Syria, or the survival of the regime led by President Bashar al-Assad. The first is the best scenario, and the latter is the worst. The three scenarios did not pay any attention to the active role of the Syrian people, but made them "objects". The council isolated the people and the people in return isolated it, and it is normal today that the council faces the risk of international isolation and insulation. The Syrian National Council, which rose rapidly on the international stage, has dropped quickly as well. If not for some international accounts stemming from the interests of the sponsor states (France, Qatar, Turkey ) and the need for affiliates and followers, the Council could have disappeared and become rubble, and we can, perhaps, cite the visit of  the Council's leadership to Paris and its meeting with President Francois Hollande and Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in this context. --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.